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The political interpretation behind the Barro-Gordon model hinges on two assumptions: 
Inflation and output growth have distributional effects, and policymakers' distributional 
desires can be represented by a quadratic loss function in terms of output and inflation. 
In this article we have examined these two assumptions. Our main results are (l) inflation 
and output growth ave significant effects on the size income distribution, (2) if policymakers 
are only concerned with the income distribution, o inflationary bias will arise; and (3) the 
Barro-Gordon model may represent a political model in which political parties care about 
both the size income distribution and output growth. However, the inflationary bias implied 
by the Barro-Gordon model should not be associated with the political color of the poli- 
cymakers. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During the last decade, the monetary policy model as developed by Barro and 
Gordon (1983) has acquired a stable position in the economic literature. The three 
basic assumptions underlying the Barro-Gordon model (henceforth BG model) 
are (!) inflation surprises have real effects, (2) the policymaker cannot enter into 
a binding policy commitment, and (3) due to economic distortions (taxation), 
output lies below its socially optimal evel. The outcomes of the BG model are 
well known. The policymaker has an incentive to create inflation surprises, but 
because inflation is fully anticipated in equilibrium, output remains at its natural 
level. 
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Originally, the BG model typically fitted with the traditional approach to eco- 
nomic policy, for the policymaker was assumed to care primarily about social 
welfare. However, since the late 1980s the BG model has been put more and more 
in a political context (Cukierman, 1992, pp. 43-45 and references therein). Political 
economic researchers adopted the structure of the BG model (with its implications) 
but provided an alternative interpretation  the objective function. Like Barro 
and Gordon, these researchers assume the policymaker to care about output 
and inflation, but regard the objective function as the outcome of some political 
process. 
What are the basic ideas behind the political interpretation of the objective 
function? Most frequently, it is argued that the economy is composed of individu- 
als whose incomes are differently affected by output and inflation (Hibbs, 1977; 
Alesina and Rosenthal, 1989; Chappell and Keech, 1988). This claim is based on 
several empirical studies, indicating that macroeconomic outcomes have important 
distributional effects: The share of income of low (high) income groups in total 
income increases (decreases) with output and inflation (see, e.g., Blinder and 
Esaki, 1978; and Blank and Blinder, 1986). As a consequence, citizens' preferences 
over output and inflation are related to their personal incomes. Political institu- 
tions translate citizens' preferences into the preference function of the poli- 
cymaker. How depends on the final objective of the policymaker. For example, if
the policymaker is only interested instaying in power, he will adopt he preference 
function of the median voter (e.g., Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986). Alternatively, 
if the policymaker caters to the distributional desires of his constituency, the 
policymaker's preference function will depend on his political color (e.g., Alesina, 
1987). 
• The political approach to economic policy has proved useful. It has increased 
our understanding of how policymakers may behave under various incentive con- 
straints and it has enabled us to examine the advantages and drawbacks of alterna- 
tive economic political institutions. For example, a well-known policy recommen- 
dation from this literature is to delegate monetary policy to an independent, 
conservative banker, who gives high priority to price stability. However, the politi- 
cal interpretation f the policymaker's objective function is still based on rather 
casual arguments. In this paper, we address the question of whether or not the 
quadratic objective function adopted in most political versions of the BG model 
fits with the empirical literature on the distributional effects of macroeconomic 
outcomes as it is claimed by its users. In Section 2, we briefly discuss this literature 
and reexamine the distributional effects of output and inflation building on the 
Blank and Blinder (1986) model. From this section, it emerges that macroeconomic 
outcomes have distributional effects, but that distributional motives alone do not 
imply an inflationary bias. Next, in Section 3, we examine a model in which citizens 
and policymakers care about both income distribution and output growth. In this 
model an inflationary bias is always generated. However, the magnitude of the 
inflation bias appears independent ofthe distributional desires of the policymaker. 
This result casts doubts on the result derived from the BG model that monetary 
policy should be carried over to an independent conservative banker (Rogoff, 
1985). Section 4 concludes this paper. 
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2.  POL IT ICAL  BARRO-GORDON MODELS AND THE S IZE  
INCOME DISTR IBUT ION 
The BG model revolves around two equations. The first equation describes a 
short-run Phillips curve, relating real output, x, or unemployment, to the difference 
between actual and expected inflation, 7r respectively ~e: 
x = 13o'(~ - ~9 + 131 13o>0 (I) 
where 13~ denotes the natural evel of output. The second equation describes the 
preferences of the policymaker by means of a quadratic loss function in terms of 
output and inflation in deviation from their desired values (~ respectively c): ~ 
£ = 0r - c) 2 + ~.B~" (x - ~)2 kBO 1> 0 and ~ > 131 (2) 
where ~,~ denotes the costs of a one unit deviation of x from ~, relative to the costs 
of a one unit deviation of x from c. To minimize algebra, we assume throughout the 
paper that the policymaker perfectly controls the inflation, which thus serves as 
instrument variable. Under the assumption that the policy maker cannot enter into 
a binding commitment, the policy model can be solved by minimizing Equation 2 
with respect to ~r, subject o Equation 1, taking ne as given. In equilibrium, private 
expectations come out so that the equilibrium inflation rate, xac, is equal to 
7r~ = c + ~.B~' 130"(~ - 131) (3). 
Equation 3 reflects the well-known result from the literature on monetary policy 
games that inflation is higher, the larger the gap between desired and natural 
output (X  - 130, the higher the desired inflation level (c) and the higher the relative 
weight attributed to the output target (Za~). All governments hat are willing to 
raise output above its natural level have an incentive to generate inflation surprises. 
However, the public anticipates this incentive and sets expectations up to the point 
where the marginal costs of unanticipated inflation equal the marginal gains. As 
a consequence, the resulting inflation leaves output unaffected (x  = 13|). 
As mentioned in the introduction, the BG model and the political BG model 
differ in their interpretation f Equation 2. In the BG model, Equation 2 measures 
welfare loss. The parameters X and c denote the socially optimal values of output 
and inflation (usually c is set at zero). There are no political conflicts, so that 
Equation 2 represents he preferences of  all citizens. 
The political interpretation f Equation 2 can be traced back to Hibbs (1977), 
who argued that different citizens have different preferences over unemployment 
(output) and inflation. His rationale for heterogeneous preferences i  based on 
empirical studies on the distribution effects of macroeconomic outcomes (e.g., 
Thurow, 1970; Miter, 1973; Blinder and Esaki, 1978; Blank and Blinder, 1986). 
These studies uggest that the share of aggregated income in total income received 
i Various pecifications are used in the literature. Sometimes, output is replaced by employ- 
ment, c is set at zero or (x-  Z) enters into the loss function linearly. 
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by lower (higher) income groups increases (decreases) with output and inflation. 
According to Hibbs, these findings imply that lower income groups are more 
averse to unemployment, or to deviations of output from its natural rate, while 
higher income groups are more concerned with inflation. In partisan models of 
monetary policy (see Persson and Tabellini, 1990, for a survey), these findings 
are captured by the assumption that political parties that promote the interests 
of lower-income groups (left-wing or liberal parties) give high priority to output 
growth relative to inflation, ),so, and that parties that cater to the distributional 
desires of higher-income groups (right-wing or conservative parties) attribute low 
priority to output growth. This literature has led to the view that monetary policy 
should be delegated to a conservative banker, because a high value of ~.~ raises 
inflation without affecting output. 
In principle, the political foundation of Equation 2 provided by Hibbs hinges 
on two claims. First, citizens have different attitudes towards output and inflation, 
due to the distributional effects of output and inflation and, second, these attitudes 
can be represented by Equation 2. The first claim is essentially an empirical matter. 
To examine it, we have updated (1961-1989) Blank and Blinder's estimates of 
equations which explain quintile-income shares by their lagged values, the unem- 
ployment rate, inflation, and a time trend. Apart from the sample period, we 
deviate from the Blank and Blinder study in two respects. First, to be in keeping 
with Equation 2, we have replaced the unemployment rate by the growth rate of 
GNP, x. Thus the specification becomes 
Si, t ~- 0L0 + Gtl 'Xt + ~t2"~t -~- Ot4"tt + Gts"Si, t - i  (4) 
where Si.t is the income share of the/th quintil¢ and t is time) Second, we have 
estimated Equation 4 with two-stage least squares instead of with ordinary least 
squares to reduce the problem of simultaneity bias, which may result from inflation 
policies aimed at affecting the income distribution (compare Beetsma nd van der 
Ploeg, 1992). The estimation results are presented in Table 1. 
Basically, the estimates confirm the conclusions of Blank and Blinder (1986): 
Increases in output growth and inflation decrease inequality. Moreover, the distrib- 
utive effects of output growth seem more profound than those of inflation. We 
have also looked at the effects of output growth and inflation on a single measure 
of income inequality, the Gini coefficient, D. The last row in Table 1 shows that 
again the estimation results are as expected. Apart from the regressions presented 
in Table 1, we have run regressions where (1) inflation was replaced with unantici- 
pated inflation, and (2) a political dummy variable was added, taking the value 
one under Democrat administrations and taking the value zero otherwise. Neither 
unanticipated inflation nor the political dummy variable appear to be significant 
at conventional levels. Moreover, Chow tests indicate that the presented estimates 
are stable over time. 
2It could be argued that in Equation 4inflation, x, should be replaced by unanticipated 
inflation, ~ - ~e. However, Blank and Blinder (1986) found no effect of unanticipated infla- 
tion on the size income distribution (s¢¢ also Fischer and Modigliani, 1978, Footnote 1). 
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Table 1: Effects of Inflation and Output on Quintile Income Shares and the 
Gini Coefficient (1961-1989) 
Lagged dep. Durbin 
Output Inflation variable Constant Trend R 2 h-statistic 
Sl.t 0.060 0.035 0.810 0.779 -0.010 0.908 1.018 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.111) (0.585) (0.004) 
$2., 0.041 0.030 0.781 2.546 -0.017 0.944 1.191 
(0.020) (0.017) (0.163) (2.062) (0.011) 
$3,, 0.007 0.035 0.470 9.419 -0.023 0.923 1.896 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.188) (3.345) (0.007) 
S4, I  - -  0.012 0.009 0.716 6.767 0.002 0.711 0.328 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.155) (3.672) (0.003) 
$5,, -0.116 -0.124 0.665 14.146 0.051 0.927 0.196 
(0.047) (0.049) (0.157) (6.386) (0.020) 
Oini(x 10) -0.017 -0.013 0.774 0.862 0.005 0.938 0.089 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.131) (0.461) (0.002) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Instrument variables: c,t, x,_ 1, it,_ j, nominal wages 
and the growth rate of world trade. Data source: Si., and Gird, CPR series P = 60; other 
variables: OECD. 
Overall, the estimates support he first claim of Hibbs (1977) that macroeco- 
nomic outcomes have distributional effects. In such an environment, it seems quite 
natural to assume that citizens differ in their preferences over output and inflation. 
Note, however, that the distributional effects of output and inflation are far from 
substantial. For example, an increase in the growth rate of output by 5 percent 
would shift only 0.6 percent of income from the three upper quintiles to the two 
lower quintiles. 
Let us now examine Hibbs' second claim that he distributional desires embodied 
in Equation 4 can he captured by Equation 2. Here we follow Hibbs (1977) in 
assuming that politics mainly revolves around income distribution. In the next 
section, we examine a model in which the policymaker cares about both the size 
income distribution and output growth. A direct way to model distributional 
motives is to assume that policymakers aim at a particular value of the Gini 
coefficient, Dd, (or Su n) and attaches costs to deviations of D from D a. Suppose 
that the policy problem can be formulated as minimizing: 
= (D,  - D,d) 2 (5) 
with respect o It, subject o the Phillips curve (1) and 
D,  = aj  + a~'xt  + a2"~t, wherea3 = aoa4"t  + as 'Dt -~ (6) 
given ~e. From this model it is easy to derive that in equilibrium 0t = ~te), optimal 
inflation policy depends on Dd: 
n = (D  ~ - a~ . f  I, - 33) /32  (7). 
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Policymakers catering to the distributional desires of lower-income groups (high 
D a) opt for higher inflation than policymakers promoting the interests of higher- 
income groups (low DO. Because in the above model the policymaker has one 
target and one instrument, hat person is always able to achieve his target, D d. 
As a consequence, policy under commitment conflicts with policy under discretion, 
and thus no inflationary bias exists (compare Persson and Tabellini, I990, p. 5). 
This result clearly conflicts with that of the BG model in which an inflationary 
bias is always present. Hence, the BG model does not properly represent the 
incentive constraints facing a policymaker who is merely interested in the size 
income distribution. 
3. DISTRIBUTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
AN EXTENDED DISTRIBUTIONAL MODEL 
The result obtained in the previous ection heavily relies on the one target-one 
instrument structure of the economic policy problem. In this section, we extend 
the model so that the policymaker has an excess of targets over instruments. In
the extended model, the policymaker cares about both the income distribution 
and economic growth) Again we assume that the policymaker's preferences can 
be represented by a quadratic loss function: 4 
= (D - Da)  2 + L (x  - Z) 2 (8). 
In Equation 8the second term on the right-hand side expresses that the policymaker 
is concerned with the growth rate of output. The parameter ~. denotes the weight 
the policymaker attributes to the output target relative to the distribution target. 
The economic policy problem is to minimize Equation 8 with respect o 7t, 
subject to Equations 1 and 6. Commitment and discretionary policy are now 
expected to deviate, because the number of targets exceeds the number of instru- 
ments. The usual derivation isapplied to determine discretionary and commitment 
inflation rates, (n a and n c, respectively) giving: 
rr c = [D a - ¢q'131 - ct3]/a2 (9) 
n a = [D a - tzl'13, - ¢t3]/a2 + k'l~0(X - 130/[ct2"(a2 + al'l~0)] 
= rt c + L'I30(Z - i~l)/[a2" (ct2 + al'130)] (10). 
From Equations 9and 10 it is easy to see that discretionary inflation, 7t a, exceeds 
commitment inflation, nc. As expected, the excess of targets generates a temptation 
to surprise and consequently an inflationary bias: In general, discretionary and 
commitment policies will differ, and a welfare loss is involved by a lack of commit- 
ment possibilities. 
31n this model, citizens and policymakers care about both their relative and absolute 
incomes. 
4We introduce the term representing the output arget in the same way as it has been 
used in Equation 2. Other specifications might be used to account for positive welfare effects 
of output without affecting the conclusions qualitatively. The specification of Equation 8 
facilitates the comparison with the BG model. 
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Does the BG model embody the same incentive constraints as the extended 
distributional model given by Equations l, 6, and 82 To answer this question, 
we compare the discretionary policy rules implied by the two models. By comparing 
Equations 3 and 11, it is easy to see that the BG model will embody the same 
incentive constraints as the extended istributional model if the following restric- 
tions are imposed on the parameters in Equation 2: 
c = [L~-  al'~31 -- a2]/a2 (11) 
and 
XBo = X/[a2"(a2 + aj'~0)]. (12). 
The first restriction (Equation 11) induces policy under commitment in the BG 
model to coincide with policy under commitment in the extended istributional 
model. The second restriction (Equation 12) makes both models generate the 
same inflationary bias. Hence, the BG model may properly represent the incentive 
constraints faced by policymakers who aim at a certain income distribution and 
try to raise output above its natural growth rate. Still, however, great care should be 
practiced in using the BG model as a representation f the extended istributional 
model. Equations 11 and 12 show that the inflationary bias implied by the extended 
distributional model is independent of policymakers' distributional desires. So if 
political parties only vary in their distributional desires - and there seems no 
reason to presume that apart from distributional considerations lower-income 
groups care more about output growth than higher-income groups - left-wing 
policy is not inferior to right-wing policy, even though inflation is higher under 
left-wing policymakers than under ight-wing policymakers, while output growth 
is not affected. 
As mentioned before, a well-known policy implication of the BG model is 
that monetary policy should be delegated to an independent conservative banker. 
Recently, Siebrand and Swank (1994) have presented evidence supporting the 
main predictions of the partisan version of the BG model, indicating that this 
recommendation should be taken seriously. However, this paper shows that if a 
conservative c ntral banker is meant o be a banker who caters to the distributional 
desires of high-income groups, this recommendation is false. From a normative 
point of view, this paper suggests that central bankers hould abstain from at- 
tempting to raise output above its natural level, because this, rather than distribu- 
tional considerations, i  the force behind excessive inflation. More generally this 
paper indicates that in current debates on monetary reforms more attention should 
be paid to the distributional implications of monetary policy. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The political interpretation behind the Barro-Gordon model hinges on two 
assumptions: Inflation and output growth have distributional effects, and poli- 
cymakers' distributional desires can be represented by a quadratic loss function 
in terms of output and inflation. In this article we have examined these two assump- 
tions. Our main results are (1) inflation and output growth have significant effects 
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on the size income distribution; (2) if policymakers are only concerned with the 
income distribution, no inflationary bias will arise; and (3) the Barro-Gordon 
model may represent a political model in which policymakers care about both 
the size income distribution and output growth. However, the inflationary bias 
implied by the Barro-Gordon model should not be associated with the political 
color of the policy maker. 
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